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Abstract
Europe has witnessed the last decade an accelerated process of economic integration. Trade
barriers were removed, the euro was introduced and ten new member states entered the European
Union. Economic integration is likely to have an impact on both labor and product markets. Unlike
most other papers, that focus on product and labor markets separately, we look at the link between
globalization and product and labor market imperfections simultaneously. To this end, we rely on a
rich panel of manufacturing firms in Belgium, a small open economy. We find that union bargaining
power is higher in sectors characterized by high price cost margins. Moreover, ignoring
imperfections on the labor market, leads to an underestimation of product market power.
Concerning the influence of globalization, our main findings are that both price cost margins and
union bargaining power are typically lower in sectors that are subject higher international
competition. This result is especially true for competition from low wage countries.
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1.  Introduction 
 
In recent years, Europe has witnessed an accelerated process of economic 
integration: Within the EU market barriers were removed, the  Euro was introduced in 
twelve member states and ten new member states joined the EU in 2004. On a global 
level, the EU is confronted with the rapid development of several Asian countries, the 
membership of China in the WTO and the emergence of China and India as new 
world powers.  
This trend towards market integration and globalization opens up European 
economies to international trade and foreign competition. This is seen in Table 1 
where selected indicators of trade openness and its evolution are reported for the EU. 
Trade has become more important over the last decade. Compared to 1992 total trade 
in the EU as a percentage of GDP has gone up substantially and especially so between 
the EU and the rest of the world. At the same time, the regional pattern of trade has 
been shifting. In 1992 only 4 % of total extra-EU imports came from China. By 2003 
the Chinese market share had increased to 10%. Likewise, the share of the new 
member states of Central and Eastern Europe (CEEC) in extra EU15-imports attained 
16% in 2003. Such figures imply that trade flows from low wage regions have gained 
substantial ground in a relatively short period of time.  
 
This integration and globalisation process affects European labor markets. In line 
with research for the US, several authors have found that international trade matters 
for the evolution of European employment and wages levels, f.e. Abraham and 
Konings (1999), Kramarz (2003) and Brock and Dobbelaere (2006). This research 
furthermore suggests that structural rigidities in European product and labor markets 
are a key factor in the transmission from global trade shocks to labor markets. Those 
rigidities are closely related to wage and price setting practices which are determined 
by factors such as the monetary policy regime, the integration of product markets, the 
existence of collective agreements and the bargaining power of unions and employers.  
 
This growing interest in structural rigidities underlies the recent research that 
explores the impact of globalisation on price and wage setting behavior. As Rodrik 
(1997) points out, globalization weakens the bargaining position of trade unions as it 
increases the substitutability of employees. This hypothesis is tested in a growing   2
number of empirical studies. Spillovers between product and labor markets are also 
emphasized in various macro models that show how more competitive pricing in the 
product markets has beneficial effects, such as lower unemployment rates, on labor 
market outcomes (e.g. Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003).  
 
This paper adds to this research by focusing on the Belgian case. We analyze how 
price-cost margins in firms are affected by international competition, taking explicitly 
into account that firms bargain over wages and employment with trade unions. Most 
papers study imperfections in product and labor markets separately
1. However, 
ignoring labor market imperfections when measuring competitiveness in the product 
market, leads to product market power being underestimated. We correct for this 
problem by measuring simultaneously price-cost margins and union bargaining 
power. In doing so, we analyse the effects of increased international economic 
integration on both price-cost margins of firms and the bargaining power of trade 
unions. To this end, we rely on a rich panel of Belgian firms that operate in the 
manufacturing sector between 1996 and 2003.  
 
Our focus on Belgium and on Belgian firm data is motivated by various reasons. 
First, Belgium is characterized by strong labor unions and rigid product markets. It 
therefore provides an interesting benchmark to test how international integration 
affects a small regulated economy in the core of the European Union. Second, the 
firm level data available are unusually rich. Our data set includes all firms between 
1996 and 2003 that have to submit by Belgian law full or abbreviated company 
accounts. In light of the recent insights of Melitz (2003) and others on the role of firm 
heterogeneity in international trade it seems natural to use micro data to model the 
effects of international competition. Third, Belgium is characterized by a substantial 
increase in its volume of trade. Figure 1 shows how the value of trade in Belgium has 
nearly doubled during the last decade. As a consequence almost all manufacturing 
sectors experienced a rising import penetration between 1995 and 2003 (see Figure 2). 
The increase in import penetration was especially pronounced in Chemicals and 
Motor Vehicles.  
 
                                                 
1 Exceptions are Bughin(1993, 1996), Crépon et al. (2002) and Dobbelaere (2004).    3
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we develop a stylised 
theoretical framework that captures the effects of international competition on price-
cost margins and labor market outcomes. Section 3 introduces the model that we seek 
to estimate and discusses the estimation strategy. In particular, we start from Hall 
(1988) to estimate price-cost margins, but extend the model to allow for bargaining as 
pointed out by Crépon et al. (2002) . In doing so, we introduce an estimation strategy 
that offers an alternative to using instrumental variables, which is due to Olley and 
Pakes (1996). Section 4 summarizes the results. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
 
2.  The Effects of Globalization: Theoretical Background 
 
To focus ideas it is useful to introduce a standard benchmark model with one 
production factor labor. The model illustrates how interactions between the product 
and the labor market matters for understanding equilibrium unemployment. It is built 
around two crucial equations, the first being a wage-setting relation, the second a 
price-setting relation.  
 
Turning to the wage equation first, let the nominal wage level depend on the 
actual price level (P)
2 and on a function that captures the institutional factors that 
determine wages or 
 
) , ( z u PF W =        (1) 
 
Where W stands for the nominal wage, u for the unemployment rate, z for all other 
factors affecting the wage. Typically, the unemployment rate exerts a negative 
influence on the wage. The intuition is straightforward: a higher unemployment rate 
weakens the bargaining position of workers and so lowers the wage. 
 
A similar equation can be derived for the price-setting behavior of firms. To keep 
things simple,  we assume that prices are set as a simple mark-up over the wage or 
                                                 
2 Typically, it depends on the expected price level, but for simplicity we assume that the expected 
prices are equal to the actual prices. In the Belgian context of wage indexation this is a reasonable 
assumption.   4
 
W P ) 1 ( μ + =        (2) 
 
In equation (2) the degree of competition in the product market plays a 
determining role. In a non-competitive product market, prices are set significantly 
higher than  marginal cost (W in this model) resulting in a large mark-up μ. In a 
perfectly competitive market, μ=0 and prices are fully determined by the wage (hence 
the real wage W/P reaches a maximum value equal to 1). 
 
Figure 3 shows the equilibrium point A in this simple economy, where the 
price-setting relation is equal to the wage-setting relation. Through its impact on the 
mark-up μ, the degree of competition in the product market has an impact on the 
equilibrium unemployment rate. Hence, characteristics of the product market affect 
the equilibrium outcome in the labor market. 
 
How does economic integration in the product market spill over to the labor 
market in this simple framework? A variety of theoretical models show that economic 
integration causes μ to fall e.g. when integration makes more product varieties 
available (Krugman, 1979) and/or reduces the market share of domestic firms 
(Helpman and Krugman, 1985). In Figure 3 international competition therefore shift 
the price-setting equation upwards: for given wage levels, prices are lower and hence 
real wage costs for firms rise to a level closer to the competitive benchmark. As a 
consequence, profit rates for individual companies decline. In addition, international 
economic integration changes the wage-setting relationship. For a given 
unemployment rate, lower profit rates translate in smaller rents that can be 
redistributed to union members. If globalization moreover implies that multinational 
enterprises can shift employment across affiliates more easily
3, then the bargaining 
power of workers will decline. All of this will force union members to accept wage 
moderation, shifting the wage setting curve down. The new equilbrium is found in B. 
Compared to the initial equilibrium in A, unemployment has gone down, prices and 
                                                 
3 Recent evidence confirms that multinational enterprises do relocate employment across affiliates, for 
the US see Brainard and Riker (1997) and Hanson, Matoloni and Slaughter (2004) for the US, for 
Europe see Braconier and Ekholm (2000) and Konings and Murphy (2006).   5
nominal wages are lower and the markup μ’ of prices over wage costs has been 
reduced.  
 
The bottom-line from this analysis is that spillovers between product and labor 
markets matter for understanding equilibrium unemployment of an economy. It is also 
clear though that the effects of international competition depend very much on the 
slopes and the responsiveness of the wage and price-setting relations in the economy, 
which is ultimately an empirical question. This is what we take up in the rest of the 
paper. 
 
 
3.  Model and Methodology 
 
The model relies on the work of Hall (1988) who showed that the Solow residual 
should be corrected for imperfect competition in the product market. It thereby offers 
a method to estimate the price cost margin without observing prices and marginal 
costs directly. Starting from a production function where output  it Q  of firm iin year 
t is produced from three inputs, namely labor  it L , capital  it K and materials  it M : 
 
) , , ( it it it it it M K L F A Q =          ( 3 )  
 
Where  it A  captures the productivity level. The function  (.) F  is homogeneous of 
degree  λ + 1  for all input factors, i.e. the returns to scale are  λ + 1 .  (.) F  can exhibit 
decreasing ( 0 < λ ), constant ( 0 = λ ) or increasing ( 0 > λ ) returns to scale. By taking 
a total differential of (3) we get:  
 
it it it it it it M it it it L it it a k k m k l k q Δ + Δ + − Δ + − Δ = − Δ λ ε ε ) ( ) ( ) ( , ,      (4) 
 
The variables  it it it it k m l q , , , a n d   it a  are the natural logarithms of  it it it it K M L Q , , , a n d  
it A  respectively.  X ε  is the elasticity of output with respect to input  X , namely   6
Q
X
X
Q
X δ
δ
ε = . Now, we use the first order conditions of profit maximization, which 
imply that  X X μα ε = : 
 
( ) it it it it it it M it it it L it it it a k k m k l k q Δ + Δ + − Δ + − Δ = − Δ λ α α μ ) ( ) ( ) ( , ,      (5) 
 
Where 
it
it
it MC
P
= μ  or the markup at the output market and  X α  is the cost share in 
total revenue of input  X , i.e. 
PQ
X PX  (X=L,M,K). We can also rewrite (5) in terms of 
the Lerner index,  it β  defned as 
it it
it it
it P
MC P
μ
β
1
1− =
−
=  or (5) becomes 
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From this equation the Lerner index and returns to scale can be estimated. This 
framework has been used to estimate the impact of trade liberalization on market 
power of firms in a number of papers, starting with Levinsohn (1993) for Turkey and 
Harrison (1994) for Côte-d’-Ivoir and more recently  by Konings, Van Cayseele and 
Warzynski (2001, 2005) for a number of industrialized and emerging economies. As 
pointed out by Crépon et al (2002), one potential problem of this framework is that it 
assumes competitive labor markets. However, most European countries are 
characterized by labor markets where negotiations between unions and firms take 
place. We therefore follow Crépon et al (2002) to incorporate a model of efficient 
bargaining in the above framework. In this model unions and firms bargain over both 
wages and employment
4. In particular, the typical Nash bargaining problem can be 
summarized as follows: 
 
Φ − Φ − − − + = Ω
1
, ) ( ) ) ( ( max wL PQ w L w L L Lw a a L w      (7) 
 
                                                 
4 For an application of this approach to the Belgian context see also Dobbelaere (2004)   7
Where  L is union membership,  L L ≤ < 0 , and  a w  represents the alternative wage
5. 
Φ is the union bargaining power;  1 0 ≤ Φ ≤ . Maximizing the equation for 
employment and wage rate gives the following first order conditions: 
 
L
PQ
w w a Φ + Φ − = ) 1 (       (8) 
L
L R
L
L R PQ
w + ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛ −
Φ =  with 
L
PQ
RL δ
δ ) (
=      (9) 
 
Solving these two expressions simultaneously gives an expression for the contract 
curve,  a L w R = . Using 
L
Q P
L
Q
Q
PQ
RL δ
δ
μ δ
δ
δ
δ
= =
) (
 together with (8) and the expression 
for the contract curve, one can find that: 
 
) 1 (
1
−
Φ −
Φ
+ = L L L α μ μα ε        ( 1 0 )  
 
Combining equations (4) and (10), an extra term which captures the union bargaining 
power appears in equation (6) or 
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it it it it L it it it
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This will be our basic equation used in the further analysis and allows us to 
estimate price cost margins and bargaining power simultaneously without having to 
make assumptions about the alternative wage rate. Crépon et al. (2002) show that in 
this setting the price-cost mark-up must be interpreted as the ratio of price over cost 
evaluated at the alternative wage instead of the bargained wage
6. A potential problem 
with estimating (11) is the endogeneity of the unobserved productivity shock,  it a Δ . 
                                                 
5 Note that for now we assume there is no other variable input factor than labor, so we assume the 
materials input to be fixed. This does not affect the bargaining outcome as long as the union 
preferences do not depend on materials (Bughin 1993, 1996). 
6 This follows from the fact that in the efficient bargaining framework marginal revenue of labor equals 
the alternative wage. As a result, firms makes input and output decisions as if it was maximizing profit 
computed at the alternative wage.   8
Since  it l  is a variable input, it depends on the productivity  it a  in the same period. As 
a result  it l Δ  is correlated with  it a Δ  and OLS estimates of the bargaining term are 
likely to be biased. Similarly,  it q Δ  will be correlated with  it a Δ  because higher 
productivity will lead to higher output.  
 
One solution is to use an instrumental variables approach. Unfortunately, it is 
often difficult to come up with appropriate instruments. Our alternative approach is 
based on recent findings of the productivity literature, more specifically on the 
methodology to estimate production functions developed by Olley and Pakes (1996). 
We follow Hoekman and Kee (2003) and De Loecker and Warzynski (2006), who 
have applied this methodology to estimate price-cost margins. In a nutshell this 
approach proxies  the unobservable productivity shock by a polynomial in capital and 
investment, both in present and lagged values. As discussed in the Appendix to this 
paper, this yields reliable estimates for the Lerner index and for union bargaining 
power but does not allow a separate identification of the returns to scale parameter.  
 
 
4.  Data and Results 
 
4.1 Data 
 
Firm data are taken from the Belfirst database. The database includes the full 
company accounts of every Belgian firm that has to report to the tax authorities. It 
includes the whole manufacturing sector (NACE code 15 to 36) with the exception of 
the recycling sector. We retrieved data for the period 1996 to 2003. The variables 
used for the analysis are turnover, tangible fixed assets, number of employees (in full 
time equivalents), wage bill and material costs (raw materials, consumables and 
services). Turnover is deflated with a Producer Price Index at the 3 digit NACE level 
provided by Eurostat. If this PPI was not available for the sector, a 2 digit NACE 
deflator was used. Tangible assets are deflated using a countrywide investment 
deflator and material costs are deflated with a countrywide intermediate goods 
deflator. The database provides also information about the ownership structure, so we 
are able to determine whether a firm has a foreign owner. However we only observe   9
ownership in 2003. Industry production data is retrieved from the PRODCOM 
database at a 4 digit NACE level. Imports and source country of imports, are made 
available by the National Bank of Belgium also at the 4 digit NACE level. 
In order for a firm to be added to the sample, we required at least three 
consecutive observations in our sample. In addition, we dropped observations which 
seemed to be obvious data input mistakes (such as firms with negative wage costs) 
and observations for which the growth rates in inputs and output were unrealistically 
high. About 4% of the data were dropped by this cleaning procedure. Our final sample 
consists of an unbalanced panel of 6091 firms and in total 35075 observations. In 
Table 2 we report summary statistics. The median firm has 20 employees, earns a 
revenue of 3.7 million euros and faces a labor cost of 34,400 euros per employee per 
year. The labor cost share in total turnover is about 23% in the average manufacturing 
firm. 
 
 
4.2 Results 
 
We start by estimating equation (6) and (11) to first obtain an estimate of the 
average mark-up without and with controlling for the bargaining power of the union. 
In a second set of regressions we augment equation (11) with factors that capture 
international economic integration.  
 
Table 3 reports the results for the mark-up and bargaining power in the 
combined sample of all manufacturing companies. In the first column we report a 
simple OLS estimate of equation (6). In the second column we provide OLS estimates 
of equation (11) where we control for the bargaining power of firms. Finally in the 
third column  we apply the Olley-Pakes correction to equation (11) in order to correct 
for potential endogeneity of the right hand side variables.  All equations are estimated 
with year and industry dummies, capturing time and industry specific shocks
7.  
 
                                                 
7 The estimations were also done with interactions between time and industry dummies. This did not 
change the results.   10
From column (1), it can be seen that the average mark-up
8 in Belgian industry 
is around 1.28. This increases to 1.35 when we take into account that unions bargain 
over wages and employment with employers. The Olley-Pakes correction in the last 
column does not affect our results all that much
9.  
 
The estimate of the average mark-up is in line with earlier work by Konings, 
Van Cayseele and Warzynski (2001) who report for Belgium an average mark-up of 
1.28. These findings are also consistent with the results found by Dobbelaere (2004) 
and Crépon et al. (2002), who estimate an average mark-up and bargaining power for 
Belgium and France of 1.49 and 1.42 respectively. The fact that the average mark-up 
is smaller when the bargaining power of firms is not taken into account is logical as 
the bargaining power term is likely to be positively correlated with the mark-up term. 
 
How important are sectoral differences in mark-ups and levels of bargaining 
power? To address this question, we estimated equation (11) for each 2-digit NACE 
sector separately
10. The estimated sectoral mark-ups are reported in Figure 4. The 
mark-up ranges from 1.24 in the Manufacturing of Furniture to 1.45 in the sector of 
Medical, Precision and Optical Instruments. Other sectors with a high mark-up are 
Basic Metals, Mineral Products, Fabricated Metals, Machinery, Electrical Machinery 
and Publishing and Printing. Sectors with a low mark-up include Wood Products, 
Food and Beverages, Chemicals, Pulp and Paper Products, Motor Vehicles and 
Wearing Apparel. 
 
Figure 5 shows the bargaining power per 2 digit NACE sector. Comparing 
Figures 4 and 5, we observe that sectors with higher mark-ups are often sectors with 
stronger union bargaining power. For instance, the sector of Medical Equipment has 
the highest bargaining power, which coincides with high mark-ups. At the other end 
of the range, the Furniture sector is characterized by both a low bargaining power and 
                                                 
8 
β
μ
−
=
1
1  
9 Note that for the correction only the observations with positive investment can be used. Estimation of 
specification (3) on this subsample showed a Lerner index of 0.259 and the coefficient for the 
bargaining term was 0.143. 
10 Tobacco products (NACE 16), Coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuel (NACE 23), Leather 
(NACE 19), Office machinery and computers (NACE 30) and Other transport equipment (NACE 35) 
are excluded due to too few observations for reliable estimates.     11
markup. This positive correlation is clearly shown in Figure 6 where we plot the 
union bargaining power against the mark-up for each sector. The statistically 
significant Pearson correlation coefficient between the two parameters equals 0.46.
11 
Those results suggest that unions are able to negotiate successful deals in sectors with 
substantial economic rents but find limited room for wage gains in competitive sectors 
where the average mark-up is low. 
 
In Table 4 we turn to the impact of globalization on mark-ups and union 
bargaining power. The first three columns report OLS estimates, while the last three 
report the same specifications but with the Olley-Pakes correction. We start by 
augmenting equation (11) with import penetration
12 and interactions of import 
penetration with the right hand side variables in (11), to test whether higher import 
penetration is associated with lower mark-ups and lower bargaining power
13. As 
discussed in section II, we expect that import competition lowers mark-ups as more 
import competition disciplines firm price setting behaviour. We expect the union 
bargaining power to be lower in sectors with high import penetration rates. Binmore 
et al. (1986) show how bargaining power can be determined by the perceived risk of 
both parties that bargaining will break down. So, if unions think globalization 
increases the risk of firms leaving the bargaining table, their bargaining power will 
drop. In the same line of reasoning, Dumont et al. (2006) claim that bargaining power 
can be considered as a measure of the credibility of the respective outside options. As 
globalization increases the credibility of the firm leaving the bargaining round, sectors 
with higher import penetration should be associated with lower bargaining power. 
From columns (2) and (5) we note that import penetration has indeed a negative and 
strongly significant effect on the mark-up and on the bargaining power of unions
14. 
Column (5) shows that a 10 percentage point increase in import penetration lowers the 
                                                 
11 The same exercise was done using different depreciation levels to compute investment to correct for 
the unobservable productivity growth using Olley-Pakes. We also experimented with a system GMM 
estimator as in Blundell and Bond (1998), using lagged employment and output as instruments. The 
results did not change.  
12 Import penetration in sector j is defined as: 
jt jt
jt
production imports
imports
+
. 
13 Whenever the interaction between a variable and the Lerner index term or bargaining term is 
included, the variable itself also enters the equation, but results are omitted here. 
14 As noted above, also import penetration itself is included in the regression. The coefficient is positive 
and highly significant. Under the classical interpretation of the left hand side variable in equation (11) 
as the Solow residual, this implies that sectors with higher import competition are more productive than 
less open sectors.   12
Lerner index by 0.011. The impact of import penetration on the union bargaining 
power is slightly lower. As a robustness check, column (2) is also estimated using a 
model with firm fixed effects. The results, reported in column (7), show no 
quantitative nor qualitative differences with the pooled OLS or Olley-Pakes estimates.  
 
In columns (3) and (6) we add a dummy LARGE which equals one if the firm 
has more than 50 employees. This dummy interacted with bargaining captures an 
essential aspect of firm level bargaining in the Belgian economy. Large firms have 
different legal obligations for union representation than small firms. In large firms it is 
moreover easier to organize a strike which can put pressure on the negotiations. 
Hence we expect the LARGE dummy to be positive. The OLS results finds this to be 
the case but this size effect becomes insignificant when applying the Olley-Pakes 
correction. 
In this same specification we also check whether the share of employment in 
foreign firms
15 in total sectoral employment matters for the bargaining power. One 
would expect this interaction to be negative since multinationals may be more 
footloose than domestic firms and as a result unions fear multinationals will reallocate 
their production. However, the interaction shows up to be positive and significant 
using the Olley-Pakes correction. This could be explained by international rent 
sharing where workers in affiliate plants are able to capture part of the parent 
company’s profits (Budd et al. 2005)
16 
Finally, the Lerner index and bargaining term were interacted with a foreign 
owner dummy
15 and an EMU dummy
17. The interactions show up to be insignificant 
except for the impact of foreign ownership on the Lerner index and the interaction 
between the EMU dummy and union bargaining power. Surprisingly, the results show 
that foreign firms have a lower mark-up than domestic firms. Most theoretical and 
empirical literature shows however that foreign firms are more efficient than domestic 
firms and should therefore, all other things equal, be able to charge a higher mark-up. 
A possible explanation could be that foreign firms produce mainly for world markets, 
which typically are more competitive.  
                                                 
15 A foreign firm is a firm which has any foreign owner in 2003. 
16 Note that our framework does not explicitly take into account international rent sharing. The 
bargaining power is a measure for the share of domestic rents captured by the union. Because of 
international rent sharing, more rents go to the union but this does not mean that the true union 
bargaining power is higher.  
17 This dummy equals one in 1999 and the years afterwards.    13
 
The above results show that sectors with high import penetration rates tend to 
have lower mark-ups and union bargaining power. Now, we distinguish between the 
different source countries of imports. In our dataset we observe for each 4 digit 
NACE sector the amount of imports coming from each country. We classify all 
countries in four groups, namely imports from other EU 15 countries, imports from 
the 10 new EU members, imports from OECD countries other than EU 25 and 
countries other than EU 25 and OECD. The last category can be seen as a low wage 
countries group. Import penetration from country group k  in sector  j  is now defined 
as
18 
k j
jk
jk production imports total
imports
IP
+
=
_
 such that  ∑
=
=
4
1 k
jk j IP IP . 
 
Figure 7 shows the import penetration evolution for all four groups of 
countries. Especially imports from low wage countries and the new EU accession 
countries have increased the past 10 years. However, it should be noted that the bulk 
of imports still come from other EU 15 countries. In 2004, almost 75% of Belgian 
imports came from other EU 15 countries, while the new accession countries and low 
wage countries accounted for 2.4% and 12.1% respectively. The share of imports 
from OECD countries other than EU 25 was 13.4%. In Figure 8 import penetration is 
shown per NACE 2 digit sector
19. It is clear that sectors with relatively high import 
rates from low wage countries are Wearing Apparel, Leather, Furniture and other 
Manufacturing, Textiles and Wood Products. Sectors with almost no imports from 
low wage countries include Chemicals, Motor Vehicles and Publishing and Printing.  
 
We use these figures to estimate whether mark-ups are correlated differently 
with import penetration from different countries. Results are shown in Table 5. The 
interaction between import penetration and the right-hand side variables has a 
negative sign for all different country groups, except for the new EU member states. 
The only interaction that is strongly significant is the one with imports from low wage 
                                                 
18 For expositional reasons, time subscripts are omitted. 
19 Imports from new accession countries are included in EU 25 figures, since the share of imports for 
this countrygroup was too small to show in the graph.   14
countries
20. The results show that sectors with high competition from low wage 
countries have a significantly lower mark-up and union bargaining power, and this for 
both the pooled OLS results as for the equation with the Olley-Pakes correction. This 
is consistent with Bernard et al. (2006) who show that plant survival and growth are 
negatively associated with imports from low-wage countries. Because of the fear of 
firms exiting the market, unions will be more reluctant to press for higher wages. The 
interaction with imports from OECD countries is marginally significant at the 10% 
level. Again as a robustness check, we ran the same regression as in column (2) but 
now with firm fixed effects. Results are reported in column (5) and show that the 
main conclusions hold also for this specification. However, the interaction between 
the Lerner index and import penetration from other EU 15 countries now becomes 
significant. 
 
 
4.3 Outsourcing 
 
In recent years, outsourcing of intermediate inputs has developed at a fast 
pace. In this section we attempt to measure the impact of outsourcing on mark-ups 
and union bargaining power. We expect intermediate imports to have a positive 
influence on a firm’s mark-up because imported intermediates lower total costs and 
thus increase the mark-up, all else equal (e.g. Amiti and Konings 2005). The impact 
of outsourcing on union bargaining power is less clear. On the one hand, a high 
outsourcing degree of a sector can lower the union bargaining power of a firm. This 
will be true when unions fear that firms will outsource more of their production to 
low-wage countries if wages are set too high. On the other hand, Kramarz (2003) 
suggests that bargained wages will increase in the intermediate imports since firms 
which buy their intermediates abroad have to specify the amount of intermediates, 
their attributes,… well in advance to the foreign producer. When the bargaining 
between union and firm takes place, the intermediates are already ordered. This 
provides the unions with hold-up opportunities. 
                                                 
20 Since imports from low wage countries show a clear upward trend, we also ran the regression with 
year dummies interacted with the Lerner index and bargaining power next to the interactions with the 
import penetration variables. This did not change the results.   15
Following Feenstra ad Hanson (1996) we measure outsourcing as the share of 
imported intermediate inputs in total intermediate inputs
21. We observe both variables 
directly from the Belgian input-output tables for the years 1995 and 2000
22. For the 
whole manufacturing sector (NACE 15 to 36) in the year 2000, 69% of all 
intermediates was imported. In 1995, this percentage was 64%. Figure 9 shows the 
outsourcing measure for each 2 digit NACE sector (except for the Tobacco industry). 
Sectors with the most imported intermediates are the Pulp and Paper Products, 
Transport Equipment, Office Machinery, and Radio, TV and Communication sectors. 
Among sectors with the lowest level of outsourcing are Food and Beverages as well 
as Publishing and Printing, Fabricated Metals and Mineral Products. Most sectors 
have witnessed an increase in there imported intermediates between 1995 and 2000. 
To measure the impact of outsourcing on bargaining, we interact the Lerner 
and bargaining term with the outsourcing measure. A danger of this approach is that 
the outsourcing measure would pick up the impact of import penetration on mark-ups 
and bargaining power. To prevent this we decided to additionally interact the Lerner 
index and bargaining term with import penetration. We do not only include the level 
of outsourcing in the equations but also the growth in outsourcing
23. The results are 
reported in Table 5. The first three columns represent simple OLS estimations, the last 
three columns show the same equations but with Olley-Pakes correction. The results 
show clearly that the growth in outsourcing is positively correlated with both mark-
ups and union bargaining power while the level of outsourcing has no significant 
effect. Increased outsourcing is likely to have a positive impact on efficiency and 
productivity as suggested by a number of recent papers that have studied the impact of 
outsourcing on total factor productivity. The results in Table 5 confirm this 
hypothesis. While these results indicate that outsourcing is associated with efficiency 
gains, this process could still coincide with job destruction as firms are contracting out 
tasks which could be performed abroad more efficiently. We can also note that 
bargaining power increases with increased outsourcing, which suggests that the 
Kramarz hypothesis holds.  
 
 
                                                 
21 Intermediate inputs are defined as inputs coming fom industrial sectors (NACE 15 to 36) 
22 These tables are made every five years, the most recent was from 2005 and used data from 2000. 
23 Growth = (outsourcing2000-outsourcing1995)/outsourcing2000   16
5.  Conclusions 
 
Europe has witnessed the last decade an accelerated process of economic 
integration. Within the EU, trade barriers were removed and the euro was introduced. 
The EU has been enlarged with ten new member states and imports from low wage 
countries have risen dramatically. Economic integration is likely to have an impact on 
labor and product markets which are both characterized by structural rigidities. Most 
papers study the impact of economic integration on product and labor markets 
separately although they are clearly interlinked. Our paper bridges this gap by looking 
at the link between globalization and product and labor market imperfections 
simultaneously. To do this, we rely on a rich panel of Belgian manufacturing firms. 
The model we use, allows us to estimate product market power and union bargaining 
power together.  
Several results emerge from our estimations. We show that union bargaining 
power and product market power are positively correlated. Unions are able to 
negotiate successful deals in sectors with high mark-ups, while they are more 
reluctant to press for high wage claims in more competitive sectors.  
Concerning the impact of globalization, we find sectors with high import 
penetration rates to have significantly lower mark-ups and union bargaining power. 
This result is consistent with the imports as market disciplining device and several 
papers that look at the impact of globalization on union bargaining power. 
Furthermore, we split up import penetration rates with respect to the country where 
the imports come from. Especially imports from low wage countries are shown to be 
concentrated in sectors characterized by low mark-ups and bargaining power. Finally 
we show that sectors that have been rationalizing their production process by 
outsourcing part of their production, tend to have higher mark-ups and union 
bargaining power.   17
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Table 1 Openness 1992-2004 (ratio of imports and exports to GDP in  
current prices) 
 
 1992  1997  2004 
Openness EU 15  0.51  0.61  0.68 
Openness EU 25  NA  0.62  0.70 
Openness EU 15 (extra EU trade 
only) 
0.14 0.20  0.21* 
Fraction imports from US in total 
Extra EU 15 imports 
0.19 0.20  0.15* 
Fraction imports from China in 
total Extra EU 15 imports 
0.04 0.06  0.10* 
Fraction imports from CEEC in 
total Extra EU 15 imports 
NA 0.10  0.16* 
Fraction exports to US in total 
Extra EU 15 exports 
0.19 0.19  0.22* 
Fraction exports to China in total 
Extra EU 15 exports 
0.02 0.02  0.04* 
Fraction exports to CEEC in total 
Extra EU 15 exports 
NA 0.14  0.18* 
Share of imports of services in 
total (EU 15) 
0.20 0.20  0.21* 
Share of imports of services in 
total (EU 25) 
NA 0.20  0.21* 
Share of exports of services in 
total (EU 15) 
0.21 0.20  0.22* 
Share of exports of services in 
total (EU 25) 
NA 0.20  0.22* 
Source: Eurostat and author’s calculations 
*refers to the year 2003 rather than 2004 
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Table 2 Summary Statistics of the Sample of Belgian Firms 
 
Variable Mean  Median  S.D. 
Turnover (X 1000 Euro)  27012  3690  148937 
Employment   91  20  350.0 
Material costs (X 1000 Euro)  21110  2382  1261968 
Tangible Fixed Assets  4395  474  27243 
Labor cost per worker (X 1000 Euro)  36.6  34.4  17.7 
Labor cost share in turnover  0.23  0.21  0.14 
Material costs share in turnover  0.67  0.69  0.17 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 Mark-up and Bargaining for Manufacturing as a Whole 
 
 OLS1  OLS2  OP 
Lerner index  0.217  0.258  0.261 
  (0.005)** (0.005)** (0.008)** 
Δk 0.126  0.065   
 (0.005)**  (0.006)**   
Bargaining term    0.142  0.143 
   (0.005)**  (0.007)** 
Mark-up  1.28 1.35 1.35 
Returns to scale  1.16  1.09.   
Bargaining power    0.124  0.125 
Observations  31521 31521 16048 
R-squared  0.23 0.32 0.33 
Nr. Firms  6091  6091  4499 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 4 Determinants bargaining power and mark-up 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  OLS1  OLS2  OLS3  OP1 OP2 OP3  FE 
Lerner Index  0.270  0.286  0.281 0.288 0.298 0.295 0.293 
 (0.007)**  (0.008)**  (0.011)** (0.013)** (0.014)** (0.018)** (0.004)** 
Δk  0.063 0.064 0.063       0.061 
  (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.006)**       (0.003)** 
Bargaining 0.140  0.164  0.150 0.144 0.171 0.132 0.173 
 (0.005)**  (0.007)**  (0.011)** (0.007)** (0.010)** (0.015)** (0.005)** 
Importpenetration X Lerner  -0.046  -0.083 -0.080 -0.086 -0.108 -0.105 -0.085 
 (0.009)**  (0.015)**  (0.015)** (0.024)** (0.026)** (0.027)** (0.008)** 
Importpenetration  X  bargaining   -0.058  -0.059   -0.068  -0.058  -0.064 
   (0.015)**  (0.015)**   (0.021)**  (0.022)**  (0.009)** 
LARGE  X  bargaining    0.021    0.011   
    (0.007)**    (0.013)   
FOREIGN X Lerner      -0.038      -0.012   
    (0.012)**    (0.023)   
FOREIGN  X  bargaining    -0.014    -0.003   
    (0.014)    (0.019)   
ForemploymentshareXLerner    0.023    -0.002   
    (0.017)    (0.029)   
ForemploymentshareXbargaining    0.030    0.056   
    (0.019)    (0.026)*   
EMU  X  Lerner    0.003    0.009   
    (0.008)    (0.014)   
EMU  X  bargaining    0.007    0.045   
    (0.009)    (0.013)**   
Observations  27194 27194 27194 13813 13813 13813 27194 
R-squared 0.32  0.32  0.32 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.30 
Nr.  Firms  5394 5394 5394.00  3939 3939 3939 5394 
Robust  standard  errors  in  parentheses        
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%         24
Table 5 Source of imports and Lerner/bargaining power 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
 OLS1  OLS2  OP1  OP2  FE 
Lerner  0.266 0.278 0.279  0.285  0.284 
  (0.007)**  (0.009)**  (0.014)** (0.015)** (0.005)** 
Δk  0.063 0.064     0.061 
  (0.006)**  (0.006)**    (0.003)** 
Bargaining  0.140 0.157 0.144  0.163  0.166 
  (0.005)**  (0.008)**  (0.007)** (0.011)** (0.005)** 
Imp.Pen.intraEU15 X Lerner  -0.024 -0.042 -0.045  -0.058 -0.042 
 (0.017)  (0.026)  (0.045) (0.047) (0.016)** 
Imp.Pen.OECD X Lerner  -0.042  -0.036 -0.162  -0.169 -0.027 
 (0.042)  (0.069) (0.088)+  (0.098)+ (0.038) 
Imp.Pen.Other X Lerner  -0.091  -0.188 -0.135  -0.193 -0.205 
 (0.023)**  (0.038)**  (0.054)* (0.058)**  (0.021)** 
Imp. Pen. NewEU X Lerner  0.010  0.011  0.399  0.642  0.034 
 (0.137)  (0.242)  (0.430) (0.456) (0.152) 
Imp. Pen.IntraEU15 X Bargaining    -0.028    -0.043  -0.041 
   (0.027)    (0.037) (0.016)* 
Imp.Pen.OECD X Bargaining    0.015    -0.009  0.031 
   (0.073)    (0.124) (0.041) 
Imp.Pen.Other X Bargaining    -0.161   -0.210 -0.170 
   (0.039)**    (0.063)**  (0.023)** 
Imp.Pen.NewEU X Bargaining    0.035    0.774  0.048 
   (0.285)    (0.429)+ (0.168) 
Observations  27194  27194  13813 13813 27194 
R-squared  0.32 0.32 0.34  0.34  0.30 
Nr.  Firms  5394  5394  3939 3939 5394 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
Table 6 Impact outsourcing on mark-up and bargaining power. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  OLS1 OLS2 OLS3 OP1  OP2  OP3 
Lerner  0.283 0.252 0.226 0.267 0.268 0.278 
  (0.026)** (0.027)** (0.029)** (0.048)** (0.050)** (0.051)** 
Δk  0.066 0.066 0.063      
  (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.006)**      
bargaining  0.131 0.105 0.100 0.156 0.131 0.126 
  (0.028)** (0.028)** (0.029)** (0.044)** (0.042)** (0.042)** 
Outsourcing*Lerner  -0.041 -0.008 0.092  -0.011 -0.014 0.012 
  (0.043) (0.042) (0.048)+ (0.078)  (0.078) (0.089) 
Outsourcing*bargaining  0.019 0.044 0.104 -0.022  0.003 0.061 
  (0.047) (0.045) (0.051)* (0.074)  (0.070) (0.074) 
(ΔOutsourcing)*Lerner    0.046 0.026   0.007 0.035 
   (0.013)**  (0.014)+   (0.046)  (0.028) 
(ΔOutsourcing)*bargaining    0.044 0.023   0.054 0.035 
   (0.014)**  (0.014)+   (0.020)**  (0.020)+ 
Import  penetration*Lerner    -0.086    -0.098 
    (0.017)**    (0.031)** 
Imp.  Pen.*bargaining   -0.065    -0.064 
    (0.018)**    (0.024)** 
Observations  31521 31521 27194 16048 16048 13813 
R-squared  0.32 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.34 
Nr.  Firms  6091 6091 5394 4499 4499 3939 
Robust standard errors in parentheses;+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Figure 1 Belgian trade and production 
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Figure 2 Import penetration per sector 
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Figure 3 Interaction between labor market and product market 
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Figure 4 Mark-up per NACE 2 digit Sector 
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Figure 5 Bargaining power per NACE 2 digit sector 
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Figure 6 Link between mark-ups and bargaining power 
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Figure 7 Trend import penetration different country groups 
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Figure 8 Import penetration per sector and country group 
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Figure 9 Outsourcing measure per sector 
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Appendix:  Controlling for the unobserved productivity shock 
 
We start from an adjusted version of equation (4):, 
 
it it it K it it M it it L it a k m l q Δ + Δ + Δ + Δ = Δ , , , ε ε ε      ( A 1 )  
This expression can be rewritten in the following way: 
) )( 1 ( , , , it it it K it it it M it it L it a k q m l q Δ + Δ − + Δ = Δ − Δ − Δ ε β β α α  (A2) 
 
Where  it a  can be decomposed in  it ω  and  it η .  it ω represents firm specific 
productivity, observed by the firm when making its variable inputs decisions in period 
t, but not by the econometrician.  it η  is an i.i.d. error term, either measurement error 
or a productivity shock not anticipated by the firm when making its input decisions. 
The accumulation equation for capital is given by  t t t i k k + − = + ) 1 ( 1 δ , where  t i  
represents investment and δ  the depreciation rate of capital. A firm makes the 
investment decision in period t, which enters the capital stock in period  1 + t . Olley 
and Pakes (1996) show that in equilibrium, investment at period t is a function of 
capital and productivity in period t.  
 
) , ( it it it k i i ω =          ( A 3 )  
 
Provided 0 > it i , this function is increasing in  it a  and thus invertible: 
 
) , ( it it it k i h = ω          ( A 4 )  
 
It follows then that: 
 
) , , , ( ) ( ) , ( 1 1 1 1 − − − − = − − = Δ it it it it it it it it it k k i i g k i h k i h ω      (A5) 
 
This expression states the unobservable change productivity shock as a function of 
observables. Proxying for this function by a polynomial in capital and investment, 
both in present and lagged values, allows us to control for the unobserved productivity   31
shock in equation (11). As a result reliable estimates for the Lerner index and union 
bargaining power are obtained; Because of the construction of a polynomial in 
investment and capital to proxy for the unobserved productivity shock, it is not 
possible to separately identify an estimate for the returns to scale. 
 
Rewriting equation (A2) , the equations, under the assumption of perfect competition 
on the labour markets and an efficient bargaining framework respectively
24 are the 
following:  
 
it it it it it it it it M it it L it k k i i g q m l q η β α α + ′ + Δ = Δ + Δ − Δ − − ) , , , ( ) ( 1 1 1 , ,      (A6) 
it it it it it it it L it it it M it it L it k k i i g l q m l q η α β β α α + ′ + Δ − + Δ = Δ + Δ − Δ − − ) , , , ( ) 1 ( ) ( 1 1 , 2 1 , ,  (A7) 
 
                                                 
24 Note that the efficient bargaining framework seems to be inconsistent with the Olley-Pakes 
methodology at first sight. Olley and Pakes (1996) assume perfect competition in the labour market, so 
firms can freely adjust their labor stock at a given wage rate. However, Belgian firms can react to 
productivity shocks by making use of temporarily labor contracts and interim labor. All this at a given 
wage rate, since this is negotiated every two years in the joint commission the firm belongs to. NBB WORKING PAPER No. 93 - OCTOBER 2006 33
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